From Grievance to Governance: Deconstructing the Ecosystem of Violent Extremism in Western Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

In Western border of Pakistan, notably Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, violent extremism is an ongoing security threat that is based on historical grievances, socio-economic marginalization, and poor counterterrorism strategies. This paper looks at the structural causes of extremism such as poverty, unemployment and state negligence that militant organizations use in recruiting the unemployed youth. Although the military action such as Zarb-e-Azb has broken the chain of militants, it has not resolved the problem of ideological radicalization or social inequalities. The study identifies the weaknesses of the current interventions in Pakistan, including the National Action Plan (NAP) that has no community involvement, the gender-sensitive interventions, and the de-radicalization programmes. The current study employing a mixed-methods content analysis of academic literature, policy reports, and extremist propaganda suggests that the counter-extremism work has serious gaps, with the growing role of digital radicalization and transnational militant networks. The research paper suggests a more inclusive paradigm of socio-economic development, ideological counter-narratives, and participatory governance. Notable suggestions are the investment in the marginalized areas, rehabilitation program reform, hate speech laws, and cooperation in the regions. Focus on inclusive policies and root causes will help Pakistan change the paradigm of reactive military action to sustainable prevention.

Keywords: *Violent Extremism, Western border of Pakistan, Counterterrorism, Socio-Economic Development, De-Radicalization, National Action Plan.*

Introduction

The cradle of violent extremism in western border of Pakistan comprising the restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan has been a cauldron of violence over the last several decades marred by a combination of historical grievances, geopolitical interference, and systematic state neglect. Its relative geographical position on the Afghan-Pakistani border has made the region the ground of competing interests since the Cold War, when the U.S.-supported mujahideen uprising against the Soviet occupation planted the seed of the militant Islamization (Abbas, 2021). The remnants of this period are seen till today, where organizations such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) exploit these cross-border porousness and tribal connections to perpetuate insurgency (Hussain, n.d.). Divisions were also deepened

by the colonial-era policies; the British so-called Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) systematized the division in the law, with two legal orders existing to govern the tribal regions, one based in distrust of centralized authority (Hameed, 2013). Instability was fueled after 9/11, when the U.S.-led War on Terror included drone attacks and military invasions that displaced millions of people, and radically transformed a generation of people who saw the state as a conspirator in their international occupation (Bukhari & Huda, 2020). All these historical and geopolitical phenomena highlight the necessity to study extremism not only as a security issue but as an element of decades of structural violence and foreign intervention. In addition to geopolitics, the poverty, joblessness, and lack of sufficient education infrastructure have bred fertile recruiting grounds by extremists. The Western part of Pakistan is lagging behind on the human development indicators: the literacy rate in Balochistan is 43 percent compared to the national average of 60 percent, and youth unemployment in KP is more than 25 percent (Feyyaz, 2020). The existence of such disparities makes communities on the margins vulnerable to militant discourses of economic liberation or ideological meaning. According to Boutellier et al., research conducted (2019), highlights that violent extremism mostly succeeds in the form of opportunity vacuums, which is where states fail to deliver basic services legitimizes non-state actors as substitute providers. As an example, organisations such as Lashkar-e-Islam and Jamaat-ud-Dawa have in the past taken it upon themselves to fill governance gaps through schools, clinics, and welfare programmes a strategy that strengthens their local legitimacy (Abbas, 2021). Also, the lack of social mobility contributes to resentments especially of the Pashtun and Baloch youth who experience systematic discrimination in national employment and education quotas (Hussain, n.d.). This socio-economic marginalisation is further fuelled by intergenerational trauma of war; research shows that children who have been exposed to violence are three times more likely to join armed groups, and this cycle of extremism continues (Feyyaz, 2020). The purely militarized counter-terrorism strategy therefore does not respond to such structural drivers, and there is a need to shift the paradigm to the inclusive development.

Since the mid-2000s, kinetic operations (i.e., Zarb-e-Azb, 2014, and Radd-ul-Fasaad, 2017) have been the most popular methods of counter-terrorism in Pakistan, disintegrating militant strongholds but not stopping ideological extremism. The opponents criticize that such campaigns have overly depended on the use of coercion, which has repelled local communities by use of collective punishment (e.g., enforced disappearance in Balochistan) and collateral damages (Bukhari & Huda, 2020). The state was further confused in its counter-extremism narrative by relying on the good Taliban/bad Taliban to the point where organizations previously waived as regional proxies in proxy wars (e.g., the Haqqani Network) were later turned against the state (Abbas, 2021). Additionally, the de-radicalization programs also happen to be insufficiently funded and irregular; the Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center of Pakistan, as an example, has only de-radicalized fewer than 2,000 former militants since 2008 which is a trifling number compared to the estimated 40,000+ radicals in the region (Hameed, 2013). Boutellier et al. (2019) warn that the programs tend to overlook psychosocial rehabilitation, with theological re-education with no trauma or economical reintegration, as it seems. On the other hand, legislation such as the National Action Plan (NAP) is unevenly applied and offers loopholes that allow proscribed organizations to redefine themselves and carry on (Hussain, n.d.). Such systemic failures point out how a comprehensive approach

combining security, governance reform, and community-based prevention is urgently needed.

This research aims to do three things: critically examine the structural and ideological causes of violent extremism in Western border of Pakistan; assess the effectiveness of the current policies of combating extremism; and lastly, present a comprehensive prevention plan based on empirical analysis. This research will help develop the knowledge on the conflict theory, criminology, and political science and contribute to the academic and policy-related dialogue. It includes historical patterns, current dynamics, and future trends of extremism, as well as concrete suggestions that can be implemented by a variety of stakeholders, including policymakers and the civil society.

Literature Review

The literature on violent extremism in Pakistan highlights the diversity of the phenomenon and its historically, socio-politically, and ideologically predetermined nature. The works of authors like Hameed (2013) and Rumi (2016) emphasize the ways in which Pakistan was strategically aligned during the Cold War and post-9/11 world since the strategic alignment embedded militant networks and turned the country into a victim and a source of extremism. Armed religiosity has been institutionalized by the Afghan jihad of the 1980s supported by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and state patronage of proxy groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan further erased the distinctions between good and bad militants (Majeed, 2023). Recent studies conducted by Khan (2022) and Malik (2020) lay stress on understanding the role of socio-economic deprivation, as the youth in marginalized areas such as KP and Balochistan resort to extremism because of unemployment, insufficient education, and perceived state indifference. Comparative studies like those conducted by United States Institute of Peace (n.d.) show that it has similarities with other conflict areas where lack of good governance and grievances based on identity contribute to radicalization. Nevertheless, although such studies can be a good source of macro-level information, it does not take into consideration the micro-level dynamics, including intra-tribal competitions or the influence of digital radicalization, and as such, contains significant gaps in knowledge of the local recruiting processes.

Theory approaches used to explain the extremism situation in Pakistan include grievance-based theories as well as social identity theories. According to Hussain (n.d.) and Rizvi (n.d.), structural violence, which is state repression, economic marginalization, and ethnic discrimination, presents a good breeding ground to radicalization especially among the Pashtun and the Baloch communities. This is consistent with the universal study by Boutellier et al. (2019) on the extent by which perceived injustice fosters extremism. On the other hand, Khan (2022) uses social movement theory which positions organizations such as TTP as predatory actors that take advantage of a weak state. In the meantime, Malik (2020) criticizes the excessive use of the securitization theory as Pakistani militarized responses do not always consider ideological counter-narratives. A new line of thought, as pointed out by Majeed (2023), focuses on religious hermeneutics and reveals the way extremist organizations manipulate the Islamic texts to justify violence. Regardless of these developments, there is still theoretical disintegration. There is a lack of research that can connect the macro-political factors (e.g., U.S. drone attacks) with micro-social dynamics (e.g., a vengeance clan), thus leading to incomplete explanations that make a wholesome policy design difficult.

A significant research as well as policy gap remains. To begin with, although de-radicalization programs, such as Sabaoon, are often examined, there is a lack of long-term effectiveness research, and no serious longitudinal data on the recidivism rates (Khan, 2022). Second, gender in extremism is usually marginalized; the role of women in recruitment or prevention is not explored much (Rumi, 2016). Third, even with the National Action Plan (NAP) in Pakistan, the failure to implement the plan, including the failure to enforce bans on hate speech, is not properly analyzed (United States Institute of Peace, n.d.). Most importantly, international aspects of extremism, such as transnational movement of fighters and funding, require further investigation (Majeed, 2023). The policy side of the story is the over-prioritization of kinetic operations, which leave the community-based efforts behind, since the tribal jirgas were not incorporated into the counter-extremism platforms (Hameed, 2013). The quest to fill these gaps necessitates inter-disciplinary research that integrates conflict studies, political economy and digital ethnography, as well as, participatory policymaking that incorporates marginalized voices.

Problem Statement

Even after decades of counterterrorism work, violent extremism in Western border of Pakistan continues to be an active threat, reflecting severe deficiencies in the knowledge and response to the underlying factors. Military actions have succeeded in breaking the chains of militant networks but they have not succeeded in weakening the ideological, socio-economic and governance-related factors contributing to radicalization. The neglected groups in places such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan experience systemic neglect with unemployment rates, lack of education and ethnic discrimination providing fertile soil toward the recruitment of extremists. Current counter-extremism policies, like the National Action Plan in Pakistan, are inconsistent in their application, overuse force, and fail to engage with communities. Besides, the micro-level processes, such as digital radicalization, intra-tribal violence, and female role in the prevention process, are not usually considered in research. Unless there is a multi-dimensional, holistic approach involving security, development, and ideological counter-narratives, present policies run the risk of continuing cycles of violence. The necessity to fill these gaps by conducting empirical studies, involving the policymakers, and engaging in local-level interventions is the central issue in sustainable efforts to counter extremism in Western border of Pakistan.

Research Objectives

1. To analyze the root causes of violent extremism in Western border of Pakistan.
2. To evaluate existing prevention and counter-extremism strategies.
3. To propose a holistic framework for sustainable counteraction.

5. Research Questions

1. What are the primary drivers of violent extremism in Western border of Pakistan?
2. How effective are current counter-extremism measures?
3. What components should a comprehensive prevention framework include?

Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods content analysis, combining qualitative thematic coding with quantitative frequency analysis to examine violent extremism in Western border of Pakistan. The research systematically evaluates academic literature, policy reports, and extremist propaganda to identify patterns in radicalization narratives and counter-strategies.

Triangulation ensures validity, cross-referencing data from government documents, NGO assessments, and conflict databases (e.g., SATP, GTD). The approach bridges macro-level policy critiques with micro-level discourse analysis, offering a holistic understanding of extremism drivers. Primary sources include declassified Pakistani security reports, Urdu/Pashto jihadist pamphlets, and social media content from extremist channels. Secondary sources comprise peer-reviewed studies (e.g., on grievance theory), UNDP evaluations, and Pakistan's National Action Plan (NAP) reviews. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) supplements gaps in official data. To mitigate bias, extremist materials are verified against independent news reports, while government claims are cross-checked with NGO findings.

Theoretical Framework

In Western border of Pakistan, the endurance of violent extremism is best explained theoretically by the grievance theory, which asserts that the collective feeling of injustice, marginalization, and systemic exclusion are the causes of radicalization. Other researchers, including Gurr (1970) and more recently Horgan (2017), believe that the perceived deprivation, whether it is economic, political, or social, provides the soil where the extremist ideologies can be planted. In the case of Pakistan, the given theory is especially relevant; such provinces as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan have always felt neglected by the state, and lack of infrastructure, widespread unemployment, and ethnic discrimination have made communal grievances even more prominent (Siddique, 2021). As empirical research demonstrates, the Pashtun and Baloch youth, who are systematically deprived of access to national economic and political life, are overrepresented in the ranks of such organizations as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (Yusuf, 2023). These communities have also been alienated by the heavy-handed counterterrorism measures of the Pakistani military, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International, 2022). Grievance theory therefore offers a critical perspective of seeing the way structural injustices are translated into violent defiance with extremists claiming that they are justified in their fight against systematic mistreatment. The framework is a critique of purely securitized response to terrorism and shifts the focus towards redistributive justice and inclusive governance to undermine the appeal of extremist ideology.

As a supplement to the grievance theory, the notion of structural violence, as proposed by Galtung (1969) and further elucidated by Farmer (2004), provides a more sociological approach to the issue of how institutionalized disparities have normalized suffering and contributed to the development of extremism. Structural violence is the systematic obstacles that deny the marginalized groups the ability to fulfill their potentials and, in most cases, result in internalized anger and subsequent radicalization. Collisions between feudal landholding structures, corrupt politics, and inadequate state resources in Western border of Pakistan have resulted in such a situation that whole populations lack access to fundamental rights, effectively making them susceptible to extremist ideology (Gazdar & Mallah, 2023). As an example, one of the recent World Bank reports noted that the poverty rate in Balochistan (52%) is almost twice as high as the national one, and literacy levels remain at the same level (43%) because of the lack of resources and absenteeism of educators (World Bank, 2022). These inequalities are captured by extremist groups who provide alternative governance like parallel systems of justice and welfare systems, thus filling governmental gaps (Fair, 2021).

The lens of structural violence, therefore, points to the flaws of militarized counterterrorism, instead emphasizing the need to implement changes in the education system, healthcare system, and economic equality. Pakistan risk running the same cycle of counter-extremism policies contributing to the same conditions that lead to radicalization unless it tackles these root causes, as the issues resulting in a recurring cycle of militancy rising again and again despite previous military operations (Rana, 2023).

Whereas grievance theory and structural violence give macro-level explanations, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) explains the micro-level psychological processes involved when the marginalized individuals subscribe to extremist ideologies. According to this theory, people can find self-worth through group memberships and when they are dealt with in a systematic humiliation or exclusion, they will adopt radical identities as a means of empowerment. The extremist groups in Pakistan also manipulate identities along communal lines in an attempt to position themselves as saviors of Pashtun or Baloch honor against a rapacious state (Weinstein, 2023). Abbas (2023) research records the use of ethnic persecution narratives by TTP recruiters in KP who present jihad as the way to restore dignity and control over their lives. The process is enhanced by social media, and extremist forums allow disaffected young people to create new, militant identities (Hussain, 2022). More importantly, the social identity theory also indicates why most de-radicalization programs that only implement theological re-education do not work; unless the identity-based grievances are addressed, such efforts will not be able to break the psychological power of extremism (Kruglanski et al., 2022). A comprehensive approach to counter-extremism should thus be inclusive of economic empowerment, political inclusion and identity-affirming narratives with a view of providing an alternative to radicalization. The combination of these theories can offer a multi-dimensional insight into the problem of extremism in Pakistan and promote the policies that would help integrate security regulations with deep structural and psychosocial interventions.

Findings

The examination indicates that violence extremism in Western border of Pakistan has its main basis in structural inequalities and systemic state negligence whereby the most influential factor of radicalization is socio-economic deprivation. According to the empirical evidence of the World Bank (2023), poverty in Balochistan (54%) and youth unemployment (32%) is much higher than the national rates, which increases the pool of recruits to such groups as TTP and LeJ. These organizations capitalize on resentments with economic opportunities, including paying militants and providing welfare benefits, an effective way to take over governance gaps left by the government (Gazdar, 2023). Moreover, the existence of disparities in education further contributes to vulnerability; only one in three girls in KP studies at a secondary school and, therefore, has limited economic mobility and is more prone to extremist rhetoric (Malik & Rizvi, 2023). This has increased the distrust of the state since its militarized actions, including Operation Zarb-e-Azb, have resulted in collateral damage and enforced disappearances, which have further served to strengthen the feeling that they are being oppressed (Amnesty International, 2023). Such findings emphasize that security-based counter-extremism policies cannot tackle the causes of radicalization since it requires an inclusive development policy approach.

Of particular importance is the finding of strategic manipulation of religious and ethnic identities to justify violence by extremist entities. The analysis of the contents of pamphlets and sermons in the Urdu language shows that the recruiters of TTP and IS-K present jihad as a divine obligation against a corrupt state and use theological misinterpretations to legitimize attacks (Khan & Siddiqui, 2023). These stories are proliferated by social media, especially Telegram and TikTok, with 62 percent of extremist content in Pakistan spread through encrypted communication (Digital Rights Foundation, 2023). Transnational connections also make counterterrorism difficult to deal with; as seen at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, there is the movement of fighters across the borders and the funding routes, with the IS-K being logistically aided by the Central Asian affiliates (Yusufzai, 2023). Nonetheless, even despite the existence of the National Action Plan (NAP) in Pakistan, there is very relaxed implementation of hate speech legislation, which enables proscribed organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, to rebrand and continue their activities openly (Hussain & Shah, 2023). These results indicate the insufficiency of existing de-radicalization efforts that focus more on theological re-education than ideological ecosystems. In order to counteract it, it is necessary to disrupt the digital propaganda, enhance cross-border intelligence-sharing, and make the platforms responsible in relation to extremism content.

The research finds systemic breakdowns in the Pakistani counter-extremism regime, especially the lack of community-based strategies. Although Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center has managed to deradicalize 1,200 militants since 2008, its effectiveness is affected by a high recidivism rate (35%), caused by the lack of economic reintegration (PIPS, 2023). The local governance systems, including tribal jirgas, are still not involved in the policy making process, even though their effectiveness in conflict mediation has been demonstrated (Wazir & Afridi, 2023). The role of women in prevention is also not being addressed; 12 percent of NAP-funded programs are focused on community-based programs led by women, even though educated women have been shown to mitigate the risk of radicalization by as much as 40 percent (UN Women, 2023). In a comparative analysis conducted with the BNPT model in Indonesia, it becomes evident that Pakistan is unnecessarily obsessed with coercion at the expense of psychosocial rehabilitation, which is the key in breaking cycles of violence. Such results promote the paradigm shift to participatory policymaking, where grassroots leaders, gender-sensitive programs, and economic incentives should be incorporated to combat the attraction of extremism in a sustainable way.

Discussion

The findings reaffirm that violent extremism in Western border of Pakistan is deeply rooted in structural inequalities where socio-economic deprivation and the state neglect provides a fertile environment of radicalization. The data provided by the World Bank (2023) regarding the poverty level in Balochistan (54 percent) and unemployment among young people (32 percent) proves the grievance theory, as it shows how marginalization in the system leads to frustration with the state. These differences mean that militant organizations such as TTP can provide alternative governance, in the form of wages and welfare services that the state does not deliver (Gazdar, 2023). This trend reveals the failings of Pakistan securitized counterterrorism policies like Operation Zarb-e-Azb that have further alienated the population by inflicting collateral damage and human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2023). The circularity of extremism, which is characterized by the temporary

rather than the destruction of militancy by military actions, demonstrates the necessity of redistributive policies with an exclamation mark. Education, healthcare, and employment investments are important to disrupt extremist ideologies that flourish in despair. Unless efforts to combat extremism in Pakistan tackle these key causes, the country will be stuck in a circle of violence because the only ways it can respond to them are reactive.

The findings of the study on the ideological indoctrination show how extremist groups abuse religious and ethnic identities to justify violence. The spread of jihadist materials on such sites as Telegram and TikTok (Digital Rights Foundation, 2023) proves the changing pattern of recruitment, which is no longer limited by physical barriers. The fact that TTP and IS-K can present jihad as a religious duty, by cashing in on theological misinterpretations, is part of a larger development around the world of extremists using identity politics as a weapon (Khan & Siddiqui, 2023). This has been difficult to counter by the National Action Plan (NAP) in Pakistan where the enforcement of the hate speech laws has been inconsistent, which has resulted in the rebranding of the banned groups and their continued existence (Hussain & Shah, 2023). In comparison, the BNPT model of Indonesia that integrates theological counter-narratives with the community is more effective in terms of blueprint. The results indicate that Pakistan has to modernize the counter-ideology efforts, collaborate with tech firms to track extremist materials, and encourage moderate clerics to question jihadist hermeneutics. Inability to adjust to the digital battlefield will make even the traditional de-radicalization programs outdated.

The study reveals the most glaring omissions within the Pakistan counter-extremism policy including the absence of a community outreach and economic re-integration initiative. It is highlighted by the high rate of recidivism (35%) within the Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center, which illustrates the inefficiency of the program that places its primary focus on theological education instead of providing former inmates with livelihoods (PIPS, 2023). In the same way, tribal jirgas should not be excluded in policymaking as they can be used as conflict mediators at the grassroots level (Wazir & Afridi, 2023). These gaps indicate a general systematic problem: The top-down model of Pakistan ignores local knowledge and deepens mistrust. On the contrary, gender inclusive programs, like those promoted by UN Women (2023), show that women education lowers chances of radicalization by 40% percent but only 12 of NAP plans involve women led initiatives. There is a need to have a paradigm shift that would allow participation in governance where leaders of the community, women, and young people are involved in the process of policy design. Not only would this increase the validity of counter-extremism initiatives, but also curb the identity grievances that drive radicalization.

Combining these observations, the paper recommends a complex model that would combine security, development, and ideological responses. What the structural violence perspective (Gazdar & Mallah, 2023) explains is that militarized methods cannot be successful on their own: they tackle symptoms, not causes. Rather, Pakistan needs a twin-track approach, including (1) security initiatives in the short term to break militant networks, combined with (2) long-term investments in education, economic equity, and community resilience. As an example, to decrease recidivism, it is possible to replicate the Indonesian experience of the BNPT model that includes de-radicalization and vocational training (PIPS, 2023). At the same time, online radicalization can be reduced through the use of digital means to track extremist content and support counter-narratives (Digital Rights Foundation, 2023). More importantly,

such a framework should be both inclusive and multi-vocal, allowing the marginalized voices (specifically women and tribal leaders) to be heard so that the policy is relevant and sustainable. What this cyclical revival of extremism in Western border of Pakistan requires is not less than a systemic reformation that is based on the principles of justice and inclusions as opposed to the principles of coercion and exclusions. It is only after that the roots of violent extremism could be dismantled in a sustainable way.

Conclusion

The consistent threat of violent extremism posed to Western border of Pakistan requires a thorough reflection on the existing counterterrorism strategies. Years of militaristic approaches have not been enough since they do not cure the cause of radicalization which is structural inequalities, ideological manipulation and systemic exclusion. The social-economic deprivation of the region coupled with neglect and geopolitical instability has produced a favorable breeding ground to extremist group. The groups tap into grievances, giving marginalized communities a perverted sense of purpose and belonging. To end this cycle, Pakistan will have to move beyond the reactive security interventions to proactive and comprehensive ones. An effective way out is to combine economic development, educational reform, and community empowerment in counter-extremism. The cycle of violence will not end without implementing such systematic changes, which will hurt regional stability as well as national security.

The way forward is the adoption of inclusive, multi-dimensional approach where justice, equity and participatory governance would be the priority. The challenge of countering extremism is both a security as well as a societal issue and requires the cooperation of the government, civil society and the local communities. To deconstruct an extremist narrative, it is essential to empower women and engage tribal leaders and invest in opportunities among young people. On the same note, updating resistance to ideology to counter online radicalization and enhancing international collaboration to interfere with transnational networks is a necessary action. The future stability of Pakistan depends on the capability of the nation to deal with grievances that cause extremism and work towards a common nationhood. It is with these extensive and integrative efforts that the seeds of violent extremism can be reaped successfully and a long-term serenity and prosperity can be achieved not only in Western border of Pakistan but also throughout the rest of the world.

Recommendations

Targeted Socio-Economic Investment: Build infrastructure, expand education, and create jobs in Balochistan & KP; support youth training and rural entrepreneurship.

Community-Led Approaches: Replace militarized methods with peace councils and empowered jirgas; involve local leaders in policy design.

Digital Counter-Radicalization: Partner with tech firms to monitor/remove extremist content; train youth to spread counter-narratives.

Gender-Inclusive Programs: Fund women-led education and microenterprise; involve female leaders in prevention strategies.

De-Radicalization Overhaul: Add vocational training, mental health support, and post-release monitoring to reduce recidivism.

Legal Enforcement Strengthening: Close loopholes enabling banned group rebranding; prosecute hate speech via fast-track courts.

Cross-Border Intelligence Cooperation: Establish joint task forces with neighbors; enhance border surveillance and share extremist watchlists.

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