

**Journal of Sociology & Cultural Research Review (JSCRR)**Available Online: <https://jscrr.edu.com.pk>Print ISSN: [3007-3103](#) Online ISSN: [3007-3111](#) Platform &  
Workflow by: [Open Journal Systems](#)**THE US INTEREST IN INDIA AND INDO-US RELATIONS: AN  
ANALYSIS OF THE ERA 1947-9/11****Umar Hayat**MPhil Scholar, American Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University,  
Islamabad[umer.hayat@cunsultant.com](mailto:umer.hayat@cunsultant.com)**Abstract**

*This article recounts the US's interest actually on India, as well tries to contextualize the historical development of the Indo- US relations during the period 1947 to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It contends that during the era of Cold War, the American interest to prevent the spread of global communism was faced with an Indian regional interest. This was evident from India's Adoption of Non-aligned foreign policy, which helped India build amicable relations with the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War Era saw a US that was poised to pursue its traditional values in the world following the collapse and subsequent disintegration of its major rival. This interest then helped enhance stronger Indo-US relations. What constrained the relationship has been India's non-aligned foreign policy, which it pursued under the Nehru Era, and its association with the Soviet Union. Over the post-Cold War such changes were buoyed by increasing recognition by the US and India of the similarity of their economic and strategic interests. India became of great value to the US geostrategic and geo-economics ambitions in the region more so in the 1990s as a possible balance against China. Qualitative approach was utilized in conducting research. The study importantly breaks the silence of most scholars in the discipline of international relations and in particular those students and scholars who concentrate on the India US relations and the consequences it has.*

**Keywords:** Cold War, Non-Alignment, Non-Proliferation, Disarmament, Neutrality

**Introduction**

In the past, India's Non-aligned Movement foreign policy, founded during Nehru Era along with links with the USSR, greatly limited Indo-US relations. Up to the end of the era of cold war, India engaged in relationships based on this policy of non-alignment. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the commencement of a process that would strengthen Indo-US relations. The Indo-US relations are dated back to the

preseparation era, the north-eastern region of countries, now known as India and Pakistan, prior to 15 August 1947, and the date which witnessed the birth of two states. From a post-colonial point of view, it is fair to state that this relationship existed before the period of partition. Technically, this can be said that history and mind of United States toward anti-imperialism was in sharpen opposition to India during her fight against British colonial Raj<sup>i</sup>. One US attitude completely supportive to Indian struggle against British Empire was to convince London to give India a temporary dominion status as an inducement for Indian army to join WWII. This fact of US's sympathy for India's was recognized and appreciated by Indian leader when the US pressure on British Raj for independence was made, especially by US President<sup>ii</sup>. Britain could no longer remember the criticism of the Indian Independence Act on August 15, 1947 turning the subcontinent into a country with the majority Muslim community - Pakistan and Hindu dominated India. It was then followed by brutal disputes among the Hindus, Sikhs, and the Muslims, with the figures of casualties going up to millions<sup>iii</sup>.

#### **Early Cold War Period (1947-1960)**

Before 1947, India had no independent strategy in how it sought to assert itself in the world. It was the download of the British Raj. In 1947, Indian leadership began to articulate an Indian foreign policy that aimed at the support of India's being a sovereign nation-state. The relationship between the US and Indian countries was quite friendly from 1948 through to the early 1950s. On October 13, 1949, Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru met the US President Harry S. Truman on his tour of the US. The journey unfurled then the formal neutralization of India in the context of the cold war, where it would assume active leadership in the position of nonaligned movement. This gave direction to the relations between the US and India during the cold war, such directions put a limit in the expansion of friendship relations and opened up the possibilities of interactions between New Delhi and Moscow. Nehru certainly recognized the venerable importance of the US when he said, "We send our greetings to the people of the US to whom the fates have ordained a foremost role in international encounters<sup>iv</sup>.

#### **Geopolitical Tensions and Strategic Partnerships**

The India's foreign position during the time of the cold war may be best described as one of non-alignment. It did not affiliate itself with any bloc, in the pursuance of an independent foreign policy and safeguarding its sovereignty. On the other hand, the main goal of this foreign policy that was disengagement from the largest global security conflict gave India a unique

standing in the geopolitical landscape of the globe. The key point is that an autonomy principle turned out to be a significant factor during the course of the formation of the Cold War policy framework. The Central concept for Third World countries was, therefore, the policy of nonalignment. These countries came together and presented unprecedented and quite diverse ideological beliefs and practices in history. It is interesting to note that on many issues, members of NAM had closer ties with the Soviet Union than with the US<sup>v</sup>.

It is pertinent to note that the former British colonies practically 'hit the ground running' in the context of bilateral relations with US and that was particularly the case with India whom the Americans had been able to establish a working relationship in the immediate aftermath Treaties of Friendship. Engagement between the two countries went as far back as 1947. A comprehensive account of This partnership can only be undertaken after establishing its history first primarily because as far as the bilateral relations were concerned, the two countries may have met at several stages during the Cold war or even around the time of the Non Aligned Movement but that may be between one or in between all the three countries on their own without any bilateral reason and hence the narrative from one country may contradict with that of another. With time this partnership became more complicated i.e. from a regional security treaty to maritime connections as a form of warfare. Between these historical events, in 1954, Pakistan plus later on in 1955, joined a formal alliance with the US which catalysed the traditional Pak US relations. Adding to its impact, two years later it joined SEATO. A strategic partnership was established with the Soviet Union to counterbalance the US Pakistan relations. India participated in some US and Common wealth like gestures or voluntary and even semi involuntary activities largely out of the need to cool off tensions between the People's Republic of China and USA, its erstwhile major ally and counter insurgent in temping Pakistani levels in various parts of the country. Nehru was why did the insecurity of independence not progress into an alteration of relationships? Relations around the Kashmir war of 1949 and around non independent and minor incursions were also marked by surprising calm. Of India and also between its interests. Indo US relations, nonetheless, were on from 1949 constantly wearing new glories subsequently. There have been remnants of diplomatic relations between both nations through the wars of 1965, 1971 and the period leading to Cold War.

On December 9th 1959 the then president of US Eisenhower visited India. Notable is the fact that he was indeed the first American president in the history to meet the Indian parliament and share dais with Jawaharlal Nehru

in Three Member Cabinet US president vis-a-vis Indian prime minister relations<sup>vi</sup>. The assumed tension and change in America's policy towards India had started cooling down in the sixties<sup>vii</sup>.

Until the year 1960, the relations of the two states did not get so bad to the point that policy debates turned into something akin to an ideological war, but some regional authorities within British India supplied India with military equipment and support against the USSR. Whereas Pakistan was about to become surrounded by and quote unquote become a Central Asian Republic the Americans came in--it seems--active to armed Pakistan. According to Walter Turner in his paper he writes about India's policy of non-alignment which was propounded on the international scene by president Nehru and appears to be self-supporting in American international politics, more or less facilitates the expansion of military power of Pakistan. This brought about a number of foreign policy shifts for India which in turn made its approach in the resolution of the Kashmir crisis inflexible and facilitated the expansion of economic, political and military relations with Soviet Union. Eisenhower later question US policy (of getting closer to Pakistan rather than India). This was a very late realisation in matters of state and policy, and certainly in international relations but one that however could not turn back the wheels of history.

In 1961, India joined the Non-Aligned Movement aiming not to get involved in the United States and Soviet Union Cold War. The Indo Sino Relations took a plunge on the October 20, 1962, when India and China fought a War. This was due to an ever-resolved dispute on the border on the countries. Nehru turned Such as Palmerston to John F. Kennedy for support of the US. The US on the other hand tried to recognize McMahon as a successor while supplying air and ammunition to India. The Administration of President Kennedy placed America on such a stand whereby they openly backed Nehru and his fellow countrymen during the Sino-Indian War the Kennedy administration supported the IndoAmerican engagement. In May 1963, National Security meeting, primitive planning was done on such instances when China could attack India again<sup>viii</sup>. When the Indo Pak war of 1965 sprung up, US and India shared a very close bond. The transformation of single Asian super power into Tripolar balance was based on the Post World War II order. Under John F. Kennedy's presidency between 1961-63 India was expected of emerging as a predominant actor while barring the expansion of Communist China. The genesis of Indo American Relations--begins in 1963, when the United States agreed to commence the delivery of enriched uranium which was up to 1994 for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.

The support falsifications are based on the idea that Washington will not interfere with the nuclear fuel which in 1966 such amount of help was breathed such level of assistance contracted into agreement<sup>ix</sup>. Understandably, the contract prevents India from acquiring the provision of nuclear fuel elsewhere. So, it does make sense to understand that the US was involved in the nuclearization of the region. The Indo American relationship became more cordial beneath the Kennedy's presidency and his successor Johnson did not desist from the cordial practice. It appears that Johnson's presidency did see the beginning of the Tarapur Atomic House Plant.

### **Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Divergences (1960s-1980s)**

Now the US never failed to provide the plant fuel as was shown in Carter's presidency. Tolerance aside, India refused to be a party to NPT when it was opened for signature in 1968 and decried the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the 1970s on ideological grounds<sup>x</sup>. New Delhi felt that such covenants were unfair against the 'have-nots' because they allowed the existing nuclear weapons states to retain their nuclear stockpiles and to conduct some limited testing. Most directly shaped by this line of reasoning, the Kennedy Presidency undertook a concerted effort to establish a different relationship with India.

Kennedy concern over India' was greater than his concern over most of the nations,' quiz Robert McMahon during his squats in the Senate and which for him was a passion. The new President Kennedy had a group that believed in India to take the South Asia policy team, regardless of Pakistan which was an ally of the United States. In a mysterious turnaround of the postures then being used now, McMahon goes to say, "Kennedy's foreign policy strategists and policymakers were also preoccupied with India, if only because," a handful of American concern's use for at least one term<sup>xi</sup>. The relationship was inscribed in terms of ups and downs, but even India's dedicated supporter in the White House went by these ups and downs. The U.S. did not seem to comprehend or respect India's attempts at maintaining an independent foreign policy, its postcolonial worries over the concept of sovereignty, and its fraught relations with neighboring countries, with the Indian subcontinent being a hotbed of conflict, as anything more than a tangential side to its primary focus on the Cold War; the net force made it quite difficult for two nations' relations to last for long without any breakdown. The embarrassment, which the U.S. had in a way added to owing to its much delayed assistance to India in the brief 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, had offered that country unparalleled prospects to develop the ties with India, mostly through selling military hardware and bitterly countering a common opponent, but it soon faded. India made matters worse by

announcing an extensive purchase of Soviet MiG-21 jets just when Congress is considering the annual aid bill<sup>xii</sup>.

With India remaining away from Soviet orbit, following its policy of nonalignment, India ceased to be of interest to America. Once again in 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan and India tussle, the US intervention in subcontinent starts. The US arms embargo came about against both, as a result of which Pakistan suffered due to its leaning to a larger extent on the US arms.

This caused a sense of discomfort in India with respect to the US because it presupposed as an attempt to once again undermine the victim (India) and the aggressor (Pakistan). It looks like the aim of the US was to prevent the Chinese engagement on the side of the Pakistan and the Soviet Union on the side of India. Several attempts were made by the US in order to quell any fighting amongst. The two nations, even going so far as to indirectly suggest that threats of involvement from either side should be sufficient cause for sustaining peace in the region. However, while in 1965 the US attempted to appease both sides of the conflict and take a neutral stance. All such pretensions were finally cast aside during the 1971 conflict between Pakistan and India<sup>xiii</sup>.

Although the arms limitation was once more put into effect for both states, the intent was to relay command of the US Enterprise carrier group to the Indian Ocean which was seen by all Indians as Geneva: North-western and Great Plains 'de Fuji power projection practice.' An action that in the milieu of Indian history is difficult, if not impossible, to erase up to this day. This action may had had an element of warning to India, but some observers do believe that the US's action was directed more at supportive Beijing of U.S.A dependability as an ally of Pakistan and subtly of China which was being invited because of its fragmentation with the Soviets) than provoking New Delhi. At any occasion the event drove home the irrefutable happening that objects to which Pakistan contributed were value the negative implication on India an Indo-US nexus<sup>xiv</sup>. For a pleased postindependence India, this was evident, reinforced American perception that India cannot be considered in earnest efforts, a scenario perhaps even much more psychologically damaging than measured hostility;

During Johnson presidency, situation got only worse, the 1965 IndiaPakistan conflict came along and reshaped once more, the place that intertwines India and Pakistan in America's foreign policy.

The collaboration between the US and the UK in ending arms embargo towards both countries in the area and restricting US aid to India during the years of drought, further deteriorated the Indo US relations on 9th May in 1965 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva a multilateral

talks aimed at non-proliferation treaty (NPT) began<sup>xv</sup>. India entered this negotiation with hope that, the NPT would be a universal disarmament treaty. Although article IV of the treaty contains a 'weak' commitment by nuclear weapons states (NWS) to "enter into good faith negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control Nye of the phenomenon which has been brought at the time its enforcement commenced, it was apparent to the superpowers that the NPT was at best only a treaty against nuclear proliferation but could be violated whenever deemed necessary<sup>xvi</sup>. According to George Perkovich, it is noticeable that in the last version of NPT, the answer to the question of creating security assurance for India with respect to China remained in doubt. Moreover, he added, and I quote: In 1967 and 1968, the question shifted from 'whether India should actually produce nuclear weapons' to 'whether India should sign a treaty relinquishing the right to produce nuclear weapons'. The instruments of the Partial and Comprehensive Test Ban treaties on the other hand, which may be interpreted as universal legal prohibitions with the aim of curbing, and in the long run, eliminating global nuclear proliferation, are completely different in their outlook from the NPT<sup>xvii</sup>. The NPT as will be argued in the final sections is better conceptualized as a legal framework that would contain the inherent paradox of nuclear weapons.

The measures for cessation of nuclear arms race taken in the shape of the NPT ensured that no further states would acquire nuclear weapons technology, albeit, enforcing a NPT on states that had already been nuclear weapon states such in 1968, countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel had been described as non-signatories to the treaty had their policy and aspirations undermined. Also, basic concerns of India revolved around the nuclear apartheid that was envisaged and rendered effective and the declaration of 'sit-tight' for the foreseeable future. The treaty needless to say established boundaries by drawing certain lines for those who had crossed them and those who had not, as well as on how far the extinct animating spirit on the determinism of non-member states potential capacities shamed regions with profound tendencies cut out for nuclear holocaust. This politically motivated effort led to the culmination of the central argument of how external and international power dynamics shaped and influenced Indian policy thinking. To India, who still wished to maintain its nuclear options in the future, this change would be much more significant. Furthermore, similar to many members of the Third World, many other nuclear countries and indeed many other nuclear states would support the Treaty in 1970<sup>xviii</sup>.

### **US-India Relations during the Reagan Era**

The change in presidency marked the beginning of a new phase. President Nixon worked on improvement with relations with India. In 1971, his National Security Advisor (NSA), Henry Kissinger, made use of Pakistan as an undercover link to build relations with the Chinese communists, the most drastic change of The US's foreign relations since the coming about of the Cold War. At the close of that year, while Indian forces were striving to liberate Dhaka from West Pakistan's hold, 'Henry Kissinger' implored the American armed forces to "intervene" to "stop a Soviet puppet, who was fighting alongside the Soviets, from defeating an ally" and "revived the Chinese to open a new front in the war to" terrify those goddamn Indians to death<sup>xix</sup>."

In order to show the Chinese (and not the Pakistanis) the reliability of the U.S. as an ally, the Nixon government finally decided to place the USS Enterprise at the feet of the Seventh Fleet, which has a nuclear atomic bomb. With no clear political strategy in view, this questionable gesture set apart only India, and did little to benefit the U.S. ally Pakistan. After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Indo-US relations went to the lowest point that they had ever been in.

According to every US diplomat that served or passed through New Delhi, the 'enterprise' incident was always on the mind of the Indian elites. The whole world remembers the day May 18, 1974, as the date when India performed its first nuclear test and hence became the first country other than the five permanent nations in the Security Council of the United Nations to announce nuclear capabilities. Such a move fuels distrust for over a period of two decades between the United States and India<sup>xx</sup>. In 1974, India conducted the explosion of its first nuclear bomb and the rest of the world watched for twenty five years as the United States cut ties with every nation willing to aid a future superpower. It was only after 1974, when the United States completed the first nuclear test named 'the smiling Buddha' that aide was cut off. However, he came to the conclusion that the test violates no agreement. Enriched uranium was sent to the Tarapur Reactor in June 1974. Walking away from the treaty he signed, Dr. Bhabha ordered plutonium bomb test in the Rajasthan desert and became the sixth country to detonate an explosive in May 1974. Not disregarding what, India declared it to be a "peaceful nuclear explosion" but rather a bomb that violated India's security throughout the dialogues during the NPT<sup>xxi</sup>. The factors are extensively discussed as the reasons that shaped the decision of India. On the influence of the President's national factors among the influences: Indira Gandhi the first and, to date the only female Prime Minister of India, was an indeterminate all-breadwinner, and the moment

of the explosion appeared to be timed in order to take advantage of this event to uplift her rather fading political career<sup>xxii</sup>.

It is important to note that there are strong political controls in the regions regarding nuclear power which is aligned in a hierarchy based on their nuclear power. India gained a profound sense of confidence from their successful military actions in the 1971 war that allowed them to test their foreign Policies in a greater range. From such events, one aspect which makes this change greatly evident is the nuclear policies that began to be shaped around the 1960s. This was also issued on behalf of China as such moves were taken for the benefit of proving themselves in front of the communist china.

It is clear that India has taken substantial steps to progress its nuclear weapons program since the wartime activities in the Bengali War in 1994 and that policy was first employed specifically for nuclear devices. It has to be highlighted that after the 1980s India decided to gradually walk away from such behaviours' as it adopted a "no first use" policy for nuclear Devices. Eventually Dire straight policy in regard to nuclear warfare began to flourish in India after the policy shifts were introduced. It is clear that India supported the assumption that the emerging regional conflicts should have been handled by local nations through the means of developing nuclear weapons<sup>xxiii</sup>.

While there are some speculated reasons why India conducted the test in 1974 its effects on the relationship between India and US would take many years to recover. The rest of the world including Canada where India acquired the CIRUS reactor that might have been utilized for the synthesis of plutonium for the nuclear device, and the United States which supplied heavy water that might have been used in the reactor responded strongly and vigorously to the test. This negative reaction of the rest of the world to India's test of 1974 was to shape relations between the two states until the end of the Cold War<sup>xxiv</sup>.

An improvement of relations between India and the United States could be noted in the late 1970s when the Janata Party led by an anti-Soviet Morarji Desai cried for the premiership but Desai was now a Soviet supported prime minister. However, it would be Clement Atlee who can be remembered as the British President of the United States. Subsequently phenomena such as mandate for abandoning nuclear exports to India as well as attending an interventionist impetus congress which sanctioned a prohibition law over the exports of industrial nuclear materials in March 1978 only consolidated nuclear non-proliferation as a core metric policy. By 1971, I instead of reducing the rate of power exports to trouble making countries such as India, indeed raised it. Even as the cold war came to an end, attention has

moved to China's mediation with President Jimmy Carter's trip to India for three days raising tension between India and Pakistan. The mid 1980s proved the significance of Florida's statues and Silk Road by expanding more on international east south west routes<sup>xxv</sup>.

But this led to tensions first between India and the United States in the 80s as India opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as well as the policies of the US. But tension began to rise across the India coast as just like in the case of Iran and Iraq, an India-Pakistan cold war broke out. So much so history has shown us it even led to the Bengal Liberation War which ultimately was the precursor to the infamous Bangladesh Liberation War.

Even after Indira Gandhi re-entered the political scene in 1980, India did not support the United States of America with respect to its involvement in the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. In exchange for the adoption of safety measures for the plant, President Carter authorized the temporary exemption of the export of 32 tons of fuel in 1980 and agreed to do so in 1982 with India<sup>xxvi</sup>.

Discussions were initiated with a view of the imposition of sanctions on the Indian nuclear program and commencement to the turning of the Carter Presidency regime when the hyperbolic notion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in America came up for discussion before the congress. This needs to end cooperation with states that dishonoured nuclear collaboration covenants with the US and also with those who detonated atomic weapons, such china and India. In any case, the US historical real and ideological commitment to its non-proliferation strategies has been, by the admission of a leading expert, inconsistent. While "the Underlying assumption of nonproliferation policy is that the spread of nuclear weapons is a serious threat to U.S.A and international security," on the ground, both commercial and other strategic interests have quite often compromised this tenet<sup>xxvii</sup>. During the Afghan war, Pakistan was not a better proof of this unfortunate rather frequent life in relation to India. India, by contrast, after being under the sanction regime, cum non signatory to the NPT, and after being often branded as a threatening nation by US decided to forgo all prospects of developing its nuclear storing program by say, lifting the nuclear sanctions imposed upon it by the US; and it didn't. In conclusion, Pakistan would take advantage of its intimacy with the US in order to obtain nuclear capability. To India, there was no greater evidence than the repeated exceptions which were given to Pakistan in the course of Afghanistan. For India, as was a non-signatory to NPT, due to the uneven relationship, would not again be subject to the military sanctions by the US which would considerably affect civil nuclear program<sup>xxviii</sup>.

In order to combat disparities, Pakistan sought to reform its relationship with Washington. It has remained like this to this day, whereas the practical implementation of the US executive has demonstrated somewhat selectivity towards horizontal proliferation with the exclusion of allied nuclear activities of Israel and Pakistan, though impacting similarly restrained nonallies such as Cuba who are criticized. This behavior, which has been enacted by restrained non-allies that include Cuba and India, has effectively been dealt with in the legislature, in this instance, Congress. In this way, Congress is less inhibited by political expediency and is more focused on nuclear proliferation. Congress has no issues making general statements of principles and proclaiming them. Consequently, the behavior of the Executive branch with respect to India would be controlled by Mexico and the extent to which Congress would use sanctions concerning nuclear issues towards the US.

For a while, India had begun forging closer relations with the USSR, and in 1971 the twenty years treaty of 'peace and friendship' was signed. Later incidents would only serve to strengthen the alliance. The USSR invasion of Afghanistan happened in 1979, and while India all but lacked a superpower at her borders to defend against the American response to this invasion only kept the Indo-US nexus dormant. Pakistan once again earned being blessed due to its location. During Reagan's presidency this location fueled the interest and with it came billions of dollars of American assistance. The Reagan presidency would focus on overseas activities that are said to include the Afghan freedom fighters or overtly called Mujahideen-e-Islam. For America to turn a blind eye towards the happenings in Afghanistan was disconcerting in India. All the massive military and economic America supplied Pakistan can only be viewed in the negative in New-Delhi whilst a little bit of attempts were made to soften the relations post-Zia's regime<sup>xxix</sup>.

On the other hand, it was after 1979 that America was no longer viable alternative for energy quite on the other contrary India managed to sell airplanes throughout the cold war to both sides of the argument even attempting to take credit for making pacts with other nations. In 1980 President Carter allowed to supposedly re-export 32 tons of fuel to France and shipments were made.

In the 1984 agreement, Washington allowed the transfer of particular technologies to India, such as gas refrigerators for naval frigates as well as engines for lightweight prototypes of Indian light aircraft. There were also unpublished technology transfers, such as the activities of Continental Electronics Corporation, which envisioned and constructed a new VLF communications facility in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu which became

operational at the end of the 1980s. Both countries sought to remedy their poor relations only in the late 1990s, and even then on a limited scale. With the emergence of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987, India came up against restrictions on the provision of rocket technology. In 1992<sup>94</sup> the United States permitted India to procure the cryogenic engine but obstructed the flow of any related technology. Only in the late 1980s, these two items the 1974 test (In the operand, the legislative result) and USSR invasion of Afghanistan (In the geopolitical result), tended to dampen the Indo-US archipelago kinetics<sup>xxx</sup>.

The 1970-1980 interim agreements that anticipated cooperation that governs legislatures helped underpin the ongoing efforts by diplomats. India was seen to play a major role in the region gradually in the course of the 1980s and this was evidenced through Anna Naylor busy working on peacekeeping missions in the island nations in Sri Lanka and the Maldives despite the fact that India had previously been embroiled with the Tamil Tigers.

President Reagan in a letter to PM 'Rajiv Gandhi' said "I appreciate your actions" but was "impressed by your willingness to restore some stability without pointless bloodshed. I have most no doubt your action will be remembered in history as one of the regional peace-making efforts"<sup>xxxi</sup>. The Trade and Economic sphere have been the development and signing of Defence and Technology transfer cooperation agreements.

On December 3, 1984 a gas canister exploded at the Carbide Plant in Bhopal that resulted in the destruction of numerous lives. The previous head of the union was actively searching for a US based CEO within the country. In mere years the losses will exceed millions in regards to life and injury. The incident worsens the state of relations between America and India and further derails years of reworking bilateral relations. In 1986, it became possible to stock up on the likes of F404 engines, and battle electronics as the US established relations with the Indian Light Combat Aircraft (in development at the time and still is). US then became on the lookout to sell missile systems in particular CASE Cray Shanghai which became the very first sale to a developing country as it was originally intended to target Europe. Even after 87, as America kept strengthening strategies in a gradual manner, India was still looking for opportunities to branch out internationally through MTCR<sup>xxxii</sup>.

Looking back at India, it was 1989 that ions had their first farmer meet denial. This in turn emerged out of K C Pant's appointment as defence head in 1989 because as mentioned earlier, this was the first time an Indian Minister was in the states for more than 25 years, at least the South West. 1986, with Gerald Ford, and 1988 with Frank Carlucci, became

instrumental in steering that meeting along with the rest of the US well onto it.

In 1984, President Reagan et al also issued a directive wherein government agencies were commanded to consolidate relationship with India and at the same time use technology for enhancement. During the 1980s, these two factors were largely recognized. In the late 1980's, the two factors were the 1974 test (by the result of the legislation) and the Soviet -Afghan conflict (by the geostrategic perspective), which maintained the frosty relations between the United States and India.

Joint ventures in defense and transfer of technology have also been enhanced. On this occasion, the Indian Defense Minister for the first time after 25 years, i.e. K C Pant visited the US in July 1989 which may be regarded as the milestone. This was preceded by the visit of American secretary of state in defense Caspar Weinberger in 1987, which was continued by Frank Carlucci in 1988. Even Reagan received a memorandum asking the government social agencies to promote better inbound relations with India and the required dual use technologies to be provided to India. In 1986 the US approved the supply of F404 General Electric Engines and avionics engines for India's light horse for the aircraft still under the development stage. Later, buy America settled to sell the computer Cray XMP14, which was the first sale which took place of the computer to a package which was not in the western developed nations<sup>xxxiii</sup>.

#### **Indo-US Relations During post-Cold War Era: 1990-9/11**

The period following the Cold War saw a shift in relations between India and the United States as both sides began to understand their common economic and strategic stakes. During the Cold War period the US interests have shifted economically and security-wise towards Asia. The US efforts to build informal coalition against the rise of China was a pressure driven move resulting from the expanding economic and military success of the country. However, during the cold war period India became an ally of the US and played an important role in maintaining a balance of power in the region. In this relation, On May 20, 1990, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates visited to India and Pakistan to diffuse the escalating heights of violence in Kashmir. The trip was executed amid the tensions that were building up to a nuclear war that would pit India against Pakistan. Hence, in backdrop of the situation mentioned above on July 24, 1991, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao government lifted every taboo that could help develop strong economic partnerships with the USA<sup>xxxiv</sup>. Under Manmohan Singh's watch, the Indian economic regime had already become more internationalized by increasing trade and investment flows,

easing controls, beginning privatizations, reforming the tax system and controlling inflation.

In 1991, Air Force General Claude M. Kicklighter undertook a trip to India, and in the course of his trip he put forward the idea for in-depth training and interchange between the armed forces of both nations. He Cold War resulted in divisions to the erstwhile Soviet Union as well as liberated the Indo US relationship from the confines of bi polarity. With the dismemberment of Soviet Union the Soviet threat was gone, as was the American compulsion to view other countries through the Soviet prism. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly opines that: "At the individual level, politicians of India and USA undertook difficult and at times political risks to push the agenda that would make Indo US relations flourish"<sup>xxxv</sup>. The cold war phase, was, of course, not a bright window for expansion of Indo-US nexus. Most aspects that the period is remembered for were defined by cold war policies and the so-called neutrality of New Delhi. What needs to be remembered is that in US-India relations, a new chapter opened only after the end of the cold war. The specific period of the cold war was not the most appropriate time for the indo-us nexus to flourish and develop.

However, India did not present a substantial threat to the United States during the Cold War era as Nehru's Theory of Neutrality was still a framework of the "Indian Foreign Policy". Yet this was not a sign that the Cold War left India and the US without any relations, quite to the contrary. Alan Kondor's report to Congress states this:

"All along the post-cold war era, that is in the year 1992, there were high level contacts and exchanges between the two countries for the first time in New Delhi India for the purpose of , among other things , strategic and military collaboration." On the Indian side and "Lieutenant General Johnny Corns" of the Pacific Command on the American side participated in the first session of the Indo- US Army 'Executive Steering Committee' meeting. The US envoy raised his fears about the budding radicalism in the name of Islam in the region. During the meeting, It was also noted by the US that India was in the region constituting the Islamic crescent, stretching from Turkey to Malaysia, the only country which could secure US interests and serve as an active regional power"<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

The US and India advanced their strategic nexus and military cooperation by establishing the Joint Steering Committee of the binary Navies which engaged in joint fleet exercises in 1992. This implied that New Delhi was important to Washington, and that the latter needed India to be an asset in the region. In this march towards India becoming US ally the part played by the Indian diaspora residing in the US could not be overlooked, they also played a significant role towards the strengthening of India US relations.

The Action of the US Congress created new connection between India and the US as India's role in the region attracted the attention of the United States<sup>xxxvii</sup>.

The US would in view of Indian significance in the perception of US Congress seek to create new categories for India's Military and Economic assistance and strive at building closer ties with India that would be in tune with the new realities to bring India to the fold of US. Both the US and India signed the "Agreed Memorandum on Defence Relations" that was to underpin joint exercises and a trade program by the year 1995. The first step was taken by the United States after the stunning rout of Iraq in the first Gulf war, which amidst strengthened links between India and the United States brought fresh possibilities for the Indo-US Nexus<sup>xxxviii</sup>. In December 1990, Deputy Secretary of Defence Henry Rowen Visited India "with a large delegation" This was followed by a trip to India by the commanders of the U.S. Pacific Command Claude Kickleigher and Charles Larson. Once he got back from the trip, Kickleigher set out a detailed won for wideranging Indo-US defense cooperation encompassing measures which would include an annual visit regime exchange, for us to bring about quarterly seminars and talks, and joint training and military workouts. The momentum of interaction picked up right away with a series of high level meetings being conducted between the Indian military leadership and the US commander of the Pacific Command<sup>xxxix</sup>.

In May 1992, the two fleets for the very first time operated together in a joint exercise which brought them closer. The relative ease of joining hands on the military front was not comparable anywhere else. In a visit to the US in March 1992, the Indian Foreign Minister J.N. Dixit met with one of the chief Defense officials, Paul Wolfowitz, "to determine the extent of US interest in Defense cooperation" with India and found that Wolfowitz "was willing to appreciate indigo's interesting proposal for a triangle"<sup>xl</sup>.

The cordiality extricated in the meeting was at odds with emotions extending conversations with his State Department fellows, the commercial representative's office, members of Congress and press. Particularly, he emphasized that Member of Congress "has absolutely no relevance to foreign and security policy the overwhelming majority of Americans hold and even less to even American strategic issues. This aggravation has reached such unprecedented proportions that it is not exaggeration at all to say that Strong US-Indian relations will not be anything outside of the Indians sitting on their hands, waiting never." In his speech in New Delhi on February 24 he highlighted sworn words that President Bill Clinton's visit to India stopped terrorists from additional armed attacks on India. State Department officials were groping for an explanation of how military

ties would dissipate the burgeoning closest between India and the US. However, the military-military ties remained a major source of institutional stability throughout the decade of the 1990s<sup>xli</sup>.

And so began a new set of boundaries as expediently as possible, altering the political environment. Some concerns regarding nuclear proliferation were always present as the bilateral trade relations between the United States and India strategized throughout the decade. However, since the early 1990s, one factor (bilateral trade) had been a fundamental component in the equation. To get out of the economic slump during 1991 where gold reserves had to be sold to pay off debts, Indian economic policy-makers shifted the paradigm by endorsing a neo liberal economic strategy along the lines of meeting international obligations. In addition to the above, India's image stands to improve as it strengthens its military to military bonds. Advocates of fostering relations with India and potentially selling weapons to a rapidly developing market were during the 90s, worried about the growing political relationship between India and the US especially that around nuclear weapons. As many as four times, more than Pakistan along the line of control swirled throughout the decade they were all set for military confrontation with armed forces all prepared for use. Many people also suggested that US stocks would be tangibly more secure with India as its counterpart after Mukherjee, given Mukherjee's impressive forecast of steadily increasing nuclear stocks replicating US stocks<sup>xlii</sup>. India's isolation over the past both strategically and economically has been due to government schemes that aimed at isolationist policies in addition to absence of innovation, however, this began to change starting in the 1990s. Needless to say, while the trend reversed on most of the states following the dissolution of the USSR, India began to advance rapidly economically. If these trends continue, then India could definitely emerge as a significant world economic power. This development has decidedly affected the US perceptions at the political and elite level. Although Indian GDP is still low in absolute figures, a 'green yellow blurred' perception of an India has also been developed by the visible success of Indian privately owned information technology and software businesses. This makes the city of Bangalore which is the center of many such companies, widely recognized metonym for India's new economic landscape<sup>xliii</sup>.

### **Challenges and Developments Leading to 9/11**

To prevent Indian expansion and the spread of nuclear war, it moved into a watch-dog position as there was involvement from both governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as experts with aims of conflict prevention measures in the specified area." Kissinger re-organised America's strategy towards South Asia and claimed that "the earthquake

came in the spring of 1998. India was signalled by Kissinger at the hardships suffered a decade near Australia that the United States had slightly changed its policy.” Looking at imagery in 1995 clearly concluded that India was preparing for a nuclear testing, therefore US immediately reacted by sending its diplomats over to new India which saw them extend threats to an immediate Test staged by India. Cut to years later, all of this spiralled into sanctions and India being forced to cancel nukes testing and biasing their alignment with the US across the globe. During these years little to no progress in relations expansion was witnessed<sup>xliiv</sup>.

Historically speaking, US globalization is made to be idealistic by the American people’s ideology as a misconception by focusing on world affairs, friendship and helping other nations, free markets etc. However, as per what Talbot claimed, justification was extremely hard for Indian perspective whereby American hegemony was focused purely on the South Asia region and US relocation of focus ended up abusing Indian sovereignty.

US officials urged India to participate in multi-party negotiations to curtail nuclear and ballistic missile programs. All this happened before Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister of India, made a trip to the United States. Sadly, Indian diplomats were wary and as a result, the discussion was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, whilst there was an emphasis on issues of proliferation, it can be noted that there were visits in 1995 as well, which included high-level visits to senior members of Cabinet – the US Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Commerce, and when ‘First Lady’ Hillary Clinton came to India<sup>xliv</sup>.

As the world entered the late 1980s, the term globalization started to be more prevalent in usage, this time in economic affairs. It was during this time that non-nuclear nations began to argue that nuclear weapons counter to their ideas of international relations. This shift in perspective was exhibited by international opinion just prior to CTBT, when the world howled in condemnation towards France and China for carrying out nuclear tests that violated the accord of halting nuclear warfare that was yet to be finalized. The general assembly of the United Nations fulfilling its mandate, sought use of World Court's powers, but it was unable to satisfaction of all parties when it opined that nuclear weapons do not have illegal use, or in its loose form, no threat of their use is illegal either<sup>xlvi</sup>. One ought to bear in mind that the issue about threat or use of nuclear arms would subsequently lead to controversy regarding the applications of international laws particularly the IHL of armed conflicts. Quite surprisingly, Indian authorities, in clear support of the Court ruling, wrote to the Tribunal in expectation of support from the Australian Government

in which the Canberra Commission on the disarmament managed to predict how a Commission of independent experts would be formed. The conclusion of the cold war served as an excellent opportunity for the international communities to jointly go against nuclear disarmament which could result in annihilation of humanity, such an opportunity ought to be acted upon swiftly else it is bound to drift away.”

In 1995, 25-year review Conference of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty was held, after dragging talks over nuclear weapons were held in 1994, they especially confirmed Indo-US contradiction over nuclear issues even when such issues were not the formal subject of the talks in which Indian official was not participating but India was closely following the course of these discussions. That is why the fact is noteworthy that – during the review Conference it was adopted the decision to extend the treaty indefinitely, urging them nuclear weapon states to relax article VI with serious regard to their participation on arms reduction and disarmament commitments, in this imposed discipline accentuated the perception against the backdrop of knowledge in the CTBT negotiations. At the same time feelings of India from the stressed eradication from the international mainstream increased. However, it was one of the first countries in the 1950s to sponsor a wide ranging comprehensive test ban on international peace and security conventions, and on that basis categorized that treaty as invalid<sup>xlvii</sup>. Indian women’s concerns focused on imposition of stereotypical treatment by wearing salient clothing as a testimony that is endorsed by experienced professionals, reconstruct the view towards reaching condensation point, and claim that India maintained its position emphasizing that entertaining nuclear weapon states is not entertained unless they were willing to take on board all aspects.

The CTBT had its one requirement that compelled India and some other countries and that was all nuke capable countries had to sign the treaty for it to enter into force. This is with regard to Article XIV, promoted by Britain, Russia, and China who might wish to weaken the treaty for their own strategic reasons, all ultimately tried to anchor India to the treaty provisions. All this effected the hands of domestic nuclear hardliners and argued that India must now declare itself to be a nuclear state. In that context, Achin Vanaik and Praful Bidwai made the observation that trying to prevent India from signing the CTBT is pointless as it is unrealistic to expect any qualitative changes in Sino-Pak Nuke Behavior. May 11 1998 India tests Nuke devices.

The Indian government declares that it has undertaken a series of underground nuclear tests at the border with Pakistan. Intelligence services and the fear that the move could trigger a regional arms race. The tests

encompass international relations and jeopardize Indian ties with the United States. The imposition of the economic sanctions that are prescribed under US law was a direct consequence of the recall of the US Ambassador to India. The collaboration was put to an end in May 1998 when the Indian nuclear tests were done, at which the US finished the repairs and overhauls of the Sea King Helicopters. The 1998 elections in India were controversial with the then ruling party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) campaigning on the nuclear program. The world somehow ignored this development even though it was certain that both India and Pakistan were empowered by their nuclear weapons which did not deter South Asia from becoming the only region in the globe with two overt nuclear states<sup>xlviii</sup>.

President Clinton's trip had been framed as a defining moment in India's post-nuclear test significance and as an acknowledgement of India's status as a great power, both in terms of its nuclear status. A more plausible explanation is that, this was a consequence of the realization that India's nuclear capacity could not be undone. The American economy has been an economy in which India has heavily relied on for trade and investment. As Karl Inderfurth, Secretary of States for South Asia, quoted, "This trip was meant to have occurred approximately three years ago. In 1997 America was going to celebrate the fiftieth occurrence since Independence commemorations, Bill Clinton was set to travel, but the government collapsed. A little while we made the nuclear detonations. We then reconsidered taking the trip, the government has collapsed and so there was this mix of internal politics and world events which postponed that". The anticipation of wanting to read between the lines was evident as the six foreign relations consultants, Shedel and Blue, prepared a folder three days ahead of the visit<sup>xlix</sup>.

Karl Inderfurth, addressing the US peace Institute on March 9, 2000, unequivocally claims that "India is counted as critical participant operating in the international system's milieu for peace and stability in Asia and its relations with USA need not be tied to American Foreign relations with any nation and also them being held hostage to US relations with any country." After, a few days a Foreign Affairs Minister of USA 'Madeleine Albright' in her address to Asia society at New York pointed out that: "India had different views and so, in the US one could rest that they did not find a way to halt discussions on nuclear and other strategic questions for the development of bilateral relations"<sup>i</sup>.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee and President Clinton, March 21 2000, on their meeting at India, reached an understanding for a 'close and qualitatively new relationship between US and India' the relevant exchanges indeed culminated in the signing of a joint statement on bilateral

relations that was dubbed US-India Relations: a Vision for Twenty First Century and Angara India refrains from nuclear weapons states that the US should assist India because: India states that it must take its own assessment of its security needs and maintain a credible minimum level of nuclear deterrent capacity.

Despite this, there is a willingness on the part of the US and on the part of India to engage in activities which stop the spread of nuclear arms. Dialogues which are ongoing will be enhanced and extended in this regard. The “Agreed Principles” on institutional talks included:

There is a need to enhance the level of monitoring and inter agency cooperation concerning counter terrorism efforts in Africa region It was agreed that there in the order of the day as appropriate, periodical India US summit meetings should be held

Formalizing and creating a framework for US-India joint statement. The end of the Iraq War and George W. Bush’s movement towards India in diplomacy saw a détente in America–India relations.

The formation of the Indo-US Science and technology forum to promote joint R&D and cross-border technology transfer and development as well as the establishment of a joint Consultative Group on clean Energy and the Environment

Furthermore, the US Secretary of State visited India for a talk ‘evolution of the new foreign policy trends’.

Of note, Prime Minister Vajpayee also concurred acceptance, President Clinton's invitation to pay a visit to Washington later during this year<sup>ii</sup>.

In his speech to the joint session of the Indian Parliament on March 22, President Clinton spoke of the commitment of both countries to renounce nuclear testing and said that India could not adopt a defense policy in line with its commitment not to pursue a nuclear weapons or missile weapon race "pursue what the prime minister has strongly reaffirmed in recent days". On the issue of India-Pakistan relations, he praised the prime minister for his "courageous trip to Lahore." He made it clear that he had not come to South Asia to mediate the dispute over Kashmir and that this was a matter of resolution between India and Pakistan.

This also came out during the interview with the American ABC on March 21st. President Clinton articulated the United States position in the dispute concerning Kashmir as: respect for the line of control, dialogue between Indian and Pakistani to be resumed, and violence as a means of resolving such disputes is renounced (the three Rs). He added that he believed there were “elements within the Pakistani government that supported those who became involved in violence in Kashmir.” However, he also claimed that there is no military solution to Kashmir and that they “deserve to have their

own concerns over merit.” Nevertheless, his remarks were of great importance from the Indian point of view. While addressing a joint media conference, Prime Minister Vajpayee claimed that if Pakistan endorsed Lahore Declaration principles, it “would respect the line of control” (which is the LoC, the renamed the 1948 ceasefire line due to the 1972 Simla Convention) and did not advocate violence or endorsed it, then he believed the dialogue could be resumed<sup>liii</sup>.

Regardless of the concord in terms of perceptions regarding the Kashmir problem and Pakistan’s role and the peace conditions in the region, Clinton, while eating at the New Delhi State Dinner, recalls his “dangerous place”. Indian President Narayanan asperse during the toast: So much has been said that the Indian subcontinent is perhaps the most dangerous region on earth today and that Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint. Such alarmist propaganda only added fuel to the fire to those who wanted to break the peace and promote terrorism and violence.

In any case, Clinton’s trip has been an all-encompassing and fruitful diplomatic endeavor in India whereby both sides sought to contain the spread of the roadblock and rather work on widening relations. On proliferation's question the USA has taken the stand not to proceed with any further testing, that it will not use nuclear weapons for the first time or that it will not inhibit transfer of sensitive technology. In the words of Secretary Albright, "it’s the beginning of a new chapter" or, as a senior government official said, "Things we’ve heard this week are the outlines of the Cold War." March 3, 1999 Backlash: the communication gulf between Pakistan and India about the event of the clash in Kashmir arose. Indians Force Pakistani Occupation in the Kashmir Region. They skilfully launch airstrikes on India in an effort to open up the boundary waters and take out armed forces until early July. He immediately invited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Washington for an emergency meeting, and after July 4, Sharif withdrew Pakistani troops from Kargil<sup>liiii</sup>.

As Karl Inderfurth mentioned at the United States Peace Institute on March 9, 2000, the United States-India relationship is not set to be any other bilateral relations of the United States, and moreover, India is perceived to be one of the major actors in international relations in the twenty first century. Which can make an important contribution of peace and stability across Asia. On March 21, 2000, Indian President Bill Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed to "create a more comprehensive and qualitatively distinctive framework for United StatesIndia relations” and they issued a joint declaration: US India Relations:

One Vision For The 21st Century.

### Conclusion:

There appears to be an interesting twist in the way the Indo-US relationship has evolved through a series of events. Formal diplomatic relations were established between India and the US in November 1946 which is much prior to the formal process of India breaking free of British colonial rule. Even Though there were areas of overlap in the US and India's interests, these two nations possessed differing attitudes on the major issues. At the center of the United States was a focus on the Cold War which was a war and a struggle against communism. India has never been a concern for the United States, because of the NAM. The US was critical of India's nonalignment outlook. In the context of the Cold War, the United States accepted Pakistan as an ally against the Soviet Union and in turn assisted financially and militarily in SEATO and CENTO. Kashmir's self-determination capturing the stance of the US on the issue of Pakistan which was a constant source of irritation to India.

The beginning of the post-Cold War period was characterized by deepening ties between India and the US on a strategic, economic and security level. In the course of the development of Indo-US relations they began to engage each other's territories under a cooperation agreement for civil-nuclear agreement. However, differences still remain in a wide range of areas including business matters, but their two-way relation seem to be improving. For the past 10 years, many top-level visits were made. There is no doubt that the Bush Administration's October 2008 Civil Bilateral Agreement with India covers all of the above interests all over the region. On his official visit to New Delhi, US President in January 2015 made assurances that the US government supports India's role as a world power. On the other side however, there are gaps in the interests and expectations of the respective countries. The Oklahoma and September 11 incidents reconfigured global political rhetoric as well as the Indo-US relationship.

### References

- <sup>i</sup> Suresh Chandra Tewari, *India-US Relations: 1947-1976* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1977), 7.
- <sup>ii</sup> Tanvir Sultan, *India-US Relations: A Study of Foreign Policies* (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1982), 37.
- <sup>iii</sup> Robert Grenier, "The US, Afghanistan and the 'India card'," *Aljazeera*, June 12, 2012  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/20126119229712686.htm>
- <sup>iv</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>v</sup> AfzaalMahmood, "A Strategic Defense Pact," *Dawn*, Lahore, (July 9, 2005): 8
- <sup>vi</sup> *ibid*

vii Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari, India-United States Strategic Partnership Implications for Pakistan, *Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (January 2011): 5-7.

JSCRR

- viii Michael A. Levi and Charles D Ferguson, "U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation A Strategy of Moving Forward," *Council on Foreign Relations Special Report*, (2006): 11 ix Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari, India-United States Strategic Partnership Implications for Pakistan, *Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (January 2011):8 x Adil Sultan Muhammad, "India – US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implications on South Asian Security Environment," *Henry L. Stimson Centre*, (2006): 8 xi Huma Yusuf, "Focused on India: Pakistan's Foreign Policy," *Dawn*, September 18, 2011 [Dawn.com/2011/09/18/cover-story-focused-on-india-pakistan-foreignpolicy/](http://Dawn.com/2011/09/18/cover-story-focused-on-india-pakistan-foreignpolicy/) (Accessed on December 20, 2012)
- xii Momin Iftikhar, "India's Civilian Nuclear Energy Program – Hype or Reality?" *South Asia Research and Analysis Studies*. (June 12, 2006): 12 xiii Huma Mir, "Pakistan's Defence Budget 2010-11," *Pakistan Observer*, February 2010, 7.
- xiv Ashley Tellis, "The Real Meaning of Obama's visit." *Forbes India*, November 24, 2010, 12. xv *The Express Tribune*, "Clinton says Pakistan Needs to 'Do More' on Militancy," May 8, 2012 [Tribune.com.pk/story/375723/Clinton-says-pakistan-needs-to-domore-on-militancy/](http://Tribune.com.pk/story/375723/Clinton-says-pakistan-needs-to-domore-on-militancy/) (Accessed on December 20, 2012) xvi Joshua Kucera, "The New Silk Road? The United States hopes that a combination of trade and infrastructure can help steer Afghanistan away from unrest – and Russia." *The Diplomat*, November 11, 2011. <https://thediplomat.com/2011/11/the-new-silk-road/> xvii Kenneth Holland, Dr, "The Implications of the Trump Administration's South Asia Policy for US-Pakistan Relations," *Security and Strategic Analysis IV* (Summer 2018):. xviii Muhammad Ishaque Fani, "The India- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan," *Pakistan Vision*, Vol. 10. no 7, (December 2, 2009): 20 xix Muhammad Ishaque Fani, "The India- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan," *Pakistan Vision*, Punjab University, Vol. 10, no. 2, (December 2009): 149 [http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDFFILES/Artical%20No-7-V10,%20No.2%20Dec\\_09.pdf](http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDFFILES/Artical%20No-7-V10,%20No.2%20Dec_09.pdf)
- xx Momin Iftikhar, "India's Civilian Nuclear Energy Program – Hype or Reality?" *South Asia Research and Analysis Studies*. (June 12, 2006): 12 xxi Shaista Tabassum, *Emerging India-US Relations: Concerns for Pakistan* (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi, 2008), 20 xxii Huma Mir, "Pakistan's Defence Budget 2010-11," *Pakistan Observer*, February 2010, 7.
- xxiii Ashley Tellis, "The Real Meaning of Obama's visit." *Forbes India*, November 24, 2010, 12.
- xxiv *The Express Tribune*, "Clinton says Pakistan Needs to 'Do More' on Militancy," May 8, 2012 [Tribune.com.pk/story/375723/Clinton-says-pakistan-needs-to-domore-on-militancy/](http://Tribune.com.pk/story/375723/Clinton-says-pakistan-needs-to-domore-on-militancy/) (Accessed on December 20, 2012)

- <sup>xxv</sup> Sridhar K. Khatri and Gert W. Kueck, *Terrorism in South Asia: Impacts on Development and Democratic Process* (Colombo: RCSS, 2003), 20 <sup>xxvi</sup> AnjanaPasricha, "India to Provide More Assistance to Afghan Defense Forces," VOA, September 11, 2017. <https://www.voanews.com/a/indiaassistance-afghanistan-defense-forces/4023686.html> <sup>xxvii</sup> SriparnaPathak, "Trump's South Asia Policy: Implications for China." In Tourangbam, Monish ;Maini, Tridivesh S. ; Pathak, Sriparna: Perspectives on Trump's South Asia Policy. URN: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168ssoar-53480-3>. pp. 13-17. <sup>xxviii</sup> Omer Farooq Khan, "Report: Pak shuns US for Chinese weapons." TNN. April 20, 2018. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/report-pakshuns-us-for-chinese-weapons/articleshow/63838695.cms>.
- <sup>xxix</sup> Sriparna Pathak, "Trump's South Asia Policy: Implications for China," *IndraStra Global* 2017, 1(1), 1-4. <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53948-6> <sup>xxx</sup> Usman Ansari, "Pakistan cosies up to Russia, but Moscow doesn't seem to want to take sides." *Defense News*. May 2, 2018. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/05/02/pakistancosies-up-to-russia-but-moscow-doesnt-seem-to-want-to-take-sides/> <sup>xxxi</sup> Ume Farwa, "Pakistan's Evolving Regional Policy: Impact Of Trump's South Asia Strategy," *South Asian Voices*, October 27, 2017. <https://southasianvoices.org/pakistans-evolving-regional-policy-impact-oftrumps-south-asia-strategy/> <sup>xxxii</sup> "Pakistan Will Continue To Have Engagement With US: Foreign Secretary." NDTV, January 7, 2018. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-willcontinue-to-have-engagement-with-us-foreign-secretary-1796897> <sup>xxxiii</sup> Kenneth Holland, "How Unipolarity Impacts Canada's Engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," in Christopher Kirkey and Michael Hawes, eds., *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World*, pp. 241-267 (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2017).
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> "Pakistan Could Face US Aid Cuts Over Human Trafficking: An aid cutback would deal a fresh blow to US-Pakistan relations following President Donald Trump's suspension in January of some \$2 billion in US security assistance." NDTV, April 12, 2018. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-could-faceus-aid-cuts-over-human-trafficking-report-1836719>
- <sup>xxxv</sup> Tridivesh Singh Maini, "Trump's Straight Talk: India's Reaction." In Tourangbam, Monish ; Maini, Tridivesh S. ; Pathak, Sriparna: Perspectives on Trump's South Asia Policy. In: *The Dossier by IndraStra* 1 (2017), 1. URN: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53480-3>, pp. 9-12.
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> Monish Tourangbam, "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Old Wine in Trump's Bottle." In Tourangbam, Monish ;Maini, Tridivesh S. ; Pathak, Sriparna: Perspectives on Trump's South Asia Policy. In: *The Dossier by IndraStra* 1 (2017), 1. URN: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53480-3>, pp. 5-8 <sup>xxxvii</sup> Joshua Kucera, "The New Silk Road? The United States hopes that a combination of trade and infrastructure can help steer Afghanistan away from unrest – and Russia." *The Diplomat*, November 11, 2011.

<https://thediplomat.com/2011/11/the219-new-silk-road/>

<sup>xxxviii</sup> “Rezaul H Laskar, “US aid to Pakistan plummets to \$526m in 2017, set to fall further: The Trump administration has warned it could cut aid and revoke Pakistan’s ‘major non- NATO ally’ status if it does not crack down on terror groups operating from its soil.” Hindustan Times, November 29, 2017. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-aid-to-pakistan-plummets-to526m-in-2017-set-to-fall-further/story-18jlohIG3OoklGv28YXNL.html> <sup>xxxix</sup>

Muhammad IshaqueFani, “The India- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan,” *Pakistan Vision*, Vol. 10. no 7, (December 2, 2009): 20 <sup>xl</sup>  
Adil Sultan Muhammad, “India – US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implications on South Asian Security Environment,” *Henry L. Stimson Centre*, (2006):24.

<sup>xli</sup> Michael Krepon, “India-US Nuclear Initiative,” *Henry L. Stimson Centre*, (2006):30.

<sup>xlii</sup> *ibid*

<sup>xliii</sup> Shireen M. Mazari, “Pakistan in the Post-9/11 Milieu,” *Institute of Strategic Studies*, 22, no 3. (2002):

<sup>xliv</sup> Das Kamaliit, “Indo-US Relations in Post-Cold War and Concerns for Pakistan,” *Political Economy Journal of India*, (July 2009):4 <sup>xliv</sup>  
PrateekShankerSrivastava, “India-US relations in Post-Cold war era and its implications for Pakistan,” *Political Article*, (May 07, 2009): 12  
<http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/Indiaus-relations-in-post-cold-warera-and-its-implications-for-pakistan-905138.html>

<sup>xlvi</sup> Hassan Askari, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 55

<sup>xlvii</sup> Das Kamaliit, “Indo-US Relations in Post-Cold War and Concerns for Pakistan,” *Political Economy Journal of India*, (July 2009):4

<sup>xlviii</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998)

<sup>xlix</sup> Knut Boeser and John Brownjohn, *Nostradamus* (New York: Radom House Value Publishing, 1994) <sup>l</sup> Huma Yusuf, “Focused on India: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” *Dawn*, September 18, 2011 [Dawn.com/2011/09/18/cover-story-focused-on-india-pakiatan-foreignpolicy/](http://Dawn.com/2011/09/18/cover-story-focused-on-india-pakiatan-foreignpolicy/) (Accessed on December 20, 2012)

<sup>li</sup> Joshua Kucera, “The New Silk Road? The United States hopes that a combination of trade and infrastructure can help steer Afghanistan away from unrest – and

Russia.” *The Diplomat*, November 11, 2011. <https://thediplomat.com/2011/11/the-new-silk-road/>

<sup>lii</sup> Kenneth Holland, Dr, "The Implications of the Trump Administration's South Asia Policy for US-Pakistan Relations," *Security and Strategic Analysis IV* (Summer 2018):

iii Muhammad IshaqueFani, "The India- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan," *Pakistan Vision*, Vol. 10. no 7, (December 2, 2009): 20

JSCRR